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Abstract
We study the difference in the result of two different risk elicitation
methods by linking estimates of risk attitudes to gender, age, person-
ality traits, a decision in a dilemma situation, and physiological states
measured by heart rate variability (HRV). Our results indicate that
differences between the methods can partly be explained by gender,
but not by personality traits. Furthermore, HRV is linked to risk-
taking in the experiment for at least one of the methods, indicating
that more stressed individuals display more risk aversion. Finally,
we find that risk attitudes are not predictive of the ability to decide
in a dilemma, but personality traits are. Surprisingly, there is also
no apparent relationship between the physiological state during the
dilemma situation and the ability to make a decision.
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1 Introduction
The commonly used concept of risk aversion in economics is mainly based on
a theoretical framework, although much of its intuition is also based on the
daily observation that people avoid or are at least hesitant when taking risks.
Both the theoretical as well as common sense understanding of risk aversion
is based on the idea that a (stable) underlying element reflects that some in-
dividuals make more risky choices than others.1 Besides providing interesting
theoretical insights, risk attitudes also have clear implications for choices in
daily life; hence understanding decision making under risk is of central im-
portance for individuals, businesses and policy makers. However, it seems
nontrivial to clearly measure risk attitudes of individuals in an experimental
laboratory environment, which makes it difficult to use experimental findings
for informing individuals, institutions and managers and raises the question
of sources determining risk attitudes.
In contrast to economists’ intuition, a large number of studies docu-
ment individual-level inconsistencies in experimentally measured risk atti-
tudes (e.g. Isaac and James, 2000; Berg et al., 2005; Hey et al., 2009; Dave
et al., 2010): Measures obtained from different methods used to infer risk
attitudes provide conflicting results and can even differ within one method
over time (Harrison et al., 2005). However, the drivers of these instabilities
or inconsistencies just as the general determinants of risk attitudes are often
unclear.
Starting from these observations, we link theory-motivated risk aversion
measures, demographics (age and gender) and personality traits, the physio-
logical state of individuals and a stressful trade-off decision when presented
with a dilemma. We use elicitation methods by Holt and Laury (HL, 2002,
1The term risk aversion was originally coined with an expected utility (EUT) paradigm
in mind, where the curvature of the utility function can be understood as a measure of
risk aversion. We will keep our main lines of argument in this EUT world, although more
advanced theories exist that are usually descriptively better in explaining observed deci-
sions, such as prospect theory (PT) or rank-dependent utility theory (RDU; see Wakker,
2010, for a detailed discussion of more advanced theories). Under these theories, the
understanding of risk attitudes can be more complicated (potentially richer) then under
EUT; these theories often need richer data to be analysed. Furthermore, large parts of
the literature looking at numerous aspects of risk attitudes in experiments, are still based
on an EUT intuition. We follow this literature and address the connection of results with
more sophisticated theories only if our data allows us to and keep these details in footnotes
for interested readers.
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2005) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (AH, 2009) to gather information about
individual risk attitudes. Personality traits are elicited using a questionnaire.
In the dilemma situation participants have to decide to save one of two swim-
mers from drowning after watching a video describing this situation.
To get physiological information of our experimental participants, through-
out the experiment we monitor the electrocardiogram (ECG) during the de-
cision making process. We focus on the heart rate variability (HRV) as a
physiological measure, which has been linked to the processing of informa-
tion in the brain (Critchley et al., 2003); using HRV is an interesting research
frontier when trying to understand economic decision making as it reflects an
individual’s sympatho-vagal balance during the decision making process. In
the economic literature HRV has been used to study decision making in the
context of gambling (Meyer et al., 2000; Wulfert et al., 2005), on perceptions
of unfair pay (Falk et al., 2011), on stress when being made accountable for
decisions (Brandts and Garofalo, 2011) and has been connected to time pref-
erences (Daly et al., 2009). Dulleck et al. (2011b) provide general guidelines
on linking economic experiments and HRV data. Using the physiological
data we aim to add to the understanding of factors underlying risk attitudes
observable in individual choices, complementing studies using neuroimaging
(e.g. Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Platt
and Huettel, 2008; Polezzi et al., 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2008), genetic infor-
mation (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2011; Dreber et al., 2011; Zhong et al., 2009)
or studies on animal behavior (e.g. McCoy and Platt, 2005).
We find that the two elicitation methods provide with differing results,
which is partly due to the different gender effect between the methods, while
personality traits explain only relatively little of risk attitudes and of the
difference between methods. We also find that risk taking and the phys-
iological state are related at least for one of the methods, indicating that
more stressed individuals are more risk averse in the experiment. Finally, we
find evidence that personality traits have an influence on whether individuals
made a decision in the dilemma situation but there was no connection to risk
attitudes, and also the physiological state did not serve as an indicator for
the ability to make a decision in the dilemma.
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2 Background and Hypotheses
The use of most elicitation methods to measure risk attitudes of individuals
builds on the idea that these are stable individual-specific characteristics.
But what are determinants of risk attitudes and can they explain differences
in the results of different risk elicitation methods? For example, gender and
age effects, which have been found to vary with risk attitudes, might be
more or less pronounced between methods.2 Furthermore, different meth-
ods could reflect risk attitudes of risk domains (for example, one method
might elicit primarily financial risk taking, another method risk taking in a
health and safety context). Thinking of domain-specific risk taking is com-
mon in psychological research (Weber et al., 2002), while economists usually
have the notion of a more general (underlying) risk attitude, which is nev-
ertheless related to domain-specific risk taking (see Dohmen et al., 2011).
Personality traits could have a varying influence on risk attitudes in different
domains (Soane and Chmiel, 2005) and if different elicitation methods give
more weight to measuring certain domains, personality traits could explain
differences between elicitation methods.
We therefore link our two laboratory-based risk elicitation methods and
personality traits, which we measure based on the so-called Big Five per-
sonality classification system (Goldberg, 1981)3. Based on results by Nichol-
son et al. (2005), who study the connection between personality traits and
domain-specific and general risk attitudes, we expect that experimentally
elicited risk taking will be positively related to extraversion and openness
and negatively related to neuroticism, agreeableness and conscientiousness.
Furthermore, we expect the results from our two risk elicitation methods to
be different, but correlated (based on Dulleck et al., 2011a). We hypothesize
that gender and personality traits are one source for explaining differences
between the two methods.
Throughout the experiment we measure the physiological state of par-
ticipants, reflected in their HRV (please see section below for more detail).
2See, for example Hartog et al. (2002) who connect risk attitudes with individual de-
mographics; they find that gender and age are related to risk attitudes. Similar results
are also included in Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). The experimental economic literature
also suggests that, females display more risk aversion, although this results is not always
significant (see Eckel and Grossman, 2008, for an overview). Another example is included
in Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008).
3Also see John et al. (2008) for developments in research using the Big Five.
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We do not hypothesize that these measures are related to decisions in a way
that they are able to explain behavior; rather, they are correlates reflecting
mental states. Using reverse inference, we interpret the fact that decisions
and changes in the physiological state occur at the same time such that they
are causally related (for the potentially causal link between HRV and mental
states see below).4 Using this approach, we analyze in how far risk taking
as well as the ability to decide in the dilemma are connected to the physio-
logical state of individuals. We conjecture that greater risk taking is related
to higher excitement, or stress. However, if individuals are able to make
excitement-optimal risk choices, a weak relationship between the riskiness
of a choice and HRV measures is also reasonable. In this case we might,
however, still observe differences across individuals in risk taking indicating
if generally more or less excited individuals take higher risks.
Our hypothesis with respect to timely decision-making in the dilemma
is that it depends on personality traits as well as on risk attitudes as both
are potentially connected to how hesitant individuals are in their decision
making. We expect more risk averse individuals to be more hesitant in
their decision making, more extrovert individuals to make a decision and
more conscientious and neurotic individuals to hesitate. We further expect
that physiologically more excited individuals, once controlling for personality
traits are more likely to make the decision of saving one of the drowning
swimmers, as it helps them to overcome the tendency to hesitate.
3 Heart rate variability measurement
We use information on heart activity of participants to understand their
physiological state during the decision making process. Our measurement
devices, portable ECG recorders (AR12) with 3 electrodes attached to a
participant’s chest, collect data on the temporal succession of heart beats.
From the recorded ECG we calculate the heart rate variability for a given
period. HRV as a physiological indicator is mainly used in medical research
(Camm et al., 1996) as a link to psychological, emotional and mental states.
Interpretations of HRV measures mainly rest on the understanding that
the autonomous nervous system (ANS) is influenced by the sympathetic
and parasympathetic systems and that the influence of the two systems
4Using reverse inference in neuroeconomic research is common, but not unproblematic
(see e.g. Phelps, 2009, for a discussion).
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is reflected in the heart rate.5 The sympathetic system is responsible for
fight-or-flight responses, using sympathetic nerves and hormones (particu-
larly adrenaline). The parasympathetic system controls rest and relaxation
through specific pacemaker cells. Both systems are constantly active paral-
lel to each other, but the degree to which one of the systems controls the
heart rate in a given period varies. The two systems operate at different
speeds. Changes in the heart rate due to increased sympathetic activity
have a longer time horizon compared to parasympathetic activity.6 This al-
lows for a decomposition of the heart rate into different frequencies, with
varying importance of sympathetic and parasympathetic activity.
Practically, this is done in estimation procedures using waves of different
lengths (or frequencies). Using decompositions into frequencies and studying
their relative influence (power) at a given time allows to identify the effect of
the sympathetic and the parasympathetic system and mediates some of the
individual heterogeneity in heart rate data.7 The ratio of the low frequency
(LF, .033-.15 Hz) to the high frequency (HF, .15-.4 Hz) mirrors the activity
of sympathetic to parasympathetic activity (see Malik, 2007) and the (HRV)
ratio LF
HF
serves as an indicator of psychologically induced physiological stress
(see Appelhans and Luecken, 2006, who also include more detail on how HRV
is measured). In the absence of major physical activity (such as walking,
running, eating etc.) as in a laboratory environment this indicator conveys
information about psychological states (Berntson and Cacioppo, 2008); for
example, a higher ratio of sympathetic to parasympathetic activity has been
connected to increased mental stress (Berntson et al., 1994).
We use heart rate measurements of our participants over the course of
the experiment to determine their HRV, giving us a succession of 5 second
intervals, which we averaged over the decision time we investigated for our
analysis (the time between entering and leaving a decision screen). Due to
unreadable measurements and instances in which participants made decisions
in less than 5 seconds, data can be missing for some choices.
5Other systems are active alongside, regulating e.g. respiration, body temperature and
blood pressure; the influence of these other systems is eliminated in our HRV data .
6Increases in sympathetic activity have their strongest effect after more, increases in
parasympathetic activity after less than 5 seconds.
7More information on the estimation procedures is available upon request.
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4 Experimental procedures
We ran our experiment in a computer lab over several session on two days
with a total of 75 participants. We recruited participants from an online pool
of about 2000 students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Participants were on
average 21.8 (s.d. .5) years old, in about equal shares of gender (51% were
male) and were mostly enrolled in various business degrees. Our invitation
included information about the length of the experiment and information
that the heart rate of participants would be measured during the experiment.
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were welcomed and asked to put on the
heart rate monitor, led to a computer and asked to go through the experiment
at their own pace; most participants needed about 30 minutes to do so. When
participants had finished the experiment, they were given their payment and
returned the heart rate monitor. Participants were paid a shop-up fee of five
Australian dollars for participating in the experiment plus a second amount
according to their decisions in the risk elicitation task (on average, about 30
Australian dollars).
Our computer-based experiment, which used a custom-made java-based
software, continued through five major stages. In the first stage participants
were asked personality-related questions of the Big Five Inventory (BFI, John
et al., 1991) and some other personality-related questions. The second stage
of the experiment consisted of a relaxation phase during which participants
were shown a picture of the ocean and heard background sound of the sea
rushing on headphones. Participants were asked to close their eyes, take a
sea shell from the table into one of their hands,8 to listen and relax. The
relaxation phase lasted for five minutes and aimed to get participants down
to an undisturbed baseline heart rate.
4.1 Risk elicitation methods
The experiment continued with the two risk elicitation methods. For both
methods, participants were first presented with instructions and had to an-
swer two test questions before advancing to the first round of decisions.
Participants played both elicitation methods over two rounds, whereas the
method by HL was played first in each round and the method by AH second.9
8The Purpose of the sea shell was to prevent participants from crossing their arms and
distorting the heart rate measurement by interfering with the electrodes on their chest.
9There should be no order effect between the methods, see Dulleck et al. (2011a).
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For final payments one of the two rounds was randomly selected and from
this round one randomly selected choice of each method was determined for
final payments to avoid wealth and portfolio-building effects.
In the risk elicitation method by HL, individuals choose between pairs
of lotteries. Each pair consists of two lotteries between two options, with a
higher and a lower payoff, whereas both lotteries have the same probabilities
for the low and high option, but differing dispersion between the outcomes.
Participants were presented with a table of 9 pairs of lotteries and had to
decide for each of these pairs if they prefer the option with more or the
one with less dispersion. Going down the table of these 9 lottery pairs, the
risk premium of choosing the safer lottery (the one with smaller dispersion)
increases with every row further down (see HL for further insights on the
design of this method and appendix B2 for an illustration).
The method by AH elicits risk attitudes by letting participants allocate a
(convex risk) budget (CRB) between their probability of winning (prob) and
the amount ω received in case of winning. Each extra percentage point of
winning costs the decision maker a certain price (price); hence, participants
chose their preferred prob∗ such that their winning amount will be ω∗ =
µ − prob∗ · price with µ being the maximum gain, or his budget, that can
be won with corresponding probµ = 0. As in this method participants face
a direct trade-off between allocating their budget µ to either the probability
of winning or the winning amount, given a simple CRRA utility function,
a risk aversion parameter can be inferred for each of the 18 decisions taken
in this method. In our experiment, participants were informed about the
price on the top of the computer screen and were able to choose prob∗ by
moving a slider. At the same time they were provided in writing with the
corresponding pair of the gain ωk in case of winning and the selected probk.
They were also shown a picture of the winning probability represented in a
pie chart and a bar chart that illustrated the gain when winning. We again
refer to the original description of the method in AH and appendix B3 for
instructions, more illustration and an example of this method.
4.2 Dilemma decision
After having finished the risk elicitation tasks, participants advanced to the
fourth stage that included a short video of about one minute length. The
video showed a life saver walking to the beach and then two people drown-
ing in the water which was supplemented by a voice asking participants to
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imagine being in the role of the life saver and having to make a decision of
saving one of the two drowning swimmers. Furthermore, information was
included saying that only one of the two could be saved (“you will only be
able to save one of them”). At the end of the video, participants automati-
cally advanced to a decision screen that asked them to save either the person
on the left or on the right from the video they had just seen. Snapshots of
the video showing a hand coming out of the water were included with the
choice options. Furthermore, a button for “more information”was included;
clicking on this option led to a screen describing more hypothetical options
to contemplate about required time after which both swimmers would have
drowned. An option to see even more information (which said that there was
no more information) and the option to return to the decision screen were
also included.10
Participants were given 20 seconds after entering the decision screen to
make a choice and save one of the two swimmers. However, participants were
not informed about this time limit and didn’t see any clock ticking down.
The reason for this was that we wanted to identify those individuals who
were able to understand the urgency of the situation and make a decision. If
they succeeded in this, they were shown a short video in which the swimmer
they had chosen to save was rescued. If they did not make a decision and
exceeded the time limit, a time-out screen appeared informing them that
they had failed to make a decision. Finally, participants advanced to a short
demographic questionnaire that included information about gender, age, stu-
dent status and some health related measures (to detect potential problems
that could distort heart rate measures), marking the end of the experiment.
5 Experimental results
5.1 Analysis separated by methods
We used two methods for the elicitation of risk attitudes which can be in-
duced from the results of both methods. We estimated individual-specific
risk aversion coefficients ri assuming Ui(x) = x
1−ri in an expected-utility
10This screen only served the purpose of using up participant’s time. Many participants
clicked one or even both “more information”buttons, and some of these still managed to
save one of the two swimmers.
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(EUT) framework for each method.11 For AH it is even possible to deter-
mine a coefficient of risk aversion for every choice made (rit). This allows
us to get an idea about the distribution of individual risk attitudes for both
methods and make some general comparisons between them. Figures 1 (a)
and (b), separated by gender, illustrate the estimated values for those partic-
ipants with s.d.(rit) ≤ 3 for AH and participants with less than 4 switching
points in HL.12
As can be seen in these overviews, there seem to be differences between
the distributions of individual estimates by gender, as the distribution for
females is flatter than for males. Women seem to be more risk loving than
men in the AH method, but more risk averse in the HL method, the second
of which is in line with previous findings. The estimated individual values for
the methods, rAHi and r
HL
i , are significantly correlated at the levels of .53 for
males (p=.002; Spearman’s ρ=.40, p=.025), .41 for females (p=.027; ρ=.50,
p=.005), and .42 for both males and females (p=.001; ρ=.38, p=.002).
In order to investigate a relationship between gender and age, and risk
attitudes, we included these in our method-specific estimation procedure.13
As we also conjectured that we would see a relationship between risk attitudes
and some of the personality traits and HRV measurements. In both methods
we tested for potential relationships using maximum likelihood estimations.14
Table 1 reports the results of this procedure.
The results from the estimation support the first impression that the role
of gender is different between the two methods: There is no apparent re-
lationship between gender and risk-taking in AH and a significant negative
relationship in HL. Similarly, there is no age effect in the AH method and
a (statistically and economically) small effect in the HL method. Adding
11We also extended our analysis beyond EUT assuming a probability weighting function
wi(p) =
pγi
(pγi+(1−p)γi )−γi . We estimated an r¯i=.04 (s.d. =.34) and a γ¯i=1.16 (s.d. =.14)
using HL. Hence, there is some evidence for probability weighting, however, we cannot
determine a γi significantly different from 1 (representing no probability weighting) for
most participants, probably du to our relatively small sample. See appendix A.1 for
distributional overviews and more detail.
12In AH this leads to the exclusion of 5 individuals and in HL of 6 individuals. We
use these restrictions as ri-estimates for these individuals do not appear very meaningful
in the context we are using; including these individuals does not qualitatively change the
overall distribution, but makes the graphs less readable.
13Throughout this paper we use normalised values for variables included in our estima-
tions.
14See Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) for a guideline on estimation procedures.
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Figure 1: Distributions of ri-parameters estimated using the two methods
separated by gender
(a) AH
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the personality characteristics and HRV measures does not change the sig-
nificance level of any of the variables in the AH method and reports the
personality characteristics as insignificant. However, there is a significant
relationship between rAH and the HRV ( LF
HF
), indicating that individuals
who were physiologically less stressed during the AH task of the experiment
took more risk, or vice versa, more stressed individuals displayed more risk
aversion.
In the HL method, further adding information on personality traits shows
that some of the personality characteristics have a significant influence on
risk attitudes: There is a positive effect of extraversion and agreeableness.
For extraversion, this is as expected. For agreeableness, the result is in the
opposite of our expectation, which was based on previous findings in the
literature. However, as the economic size of the effect is relatively small, we
do not read too much into this result. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence
that for the HL method HRV is significantly related to risk-taking.15
15An extension of our analysis allowing for probability weighting in HL (see Appendix
A.2) shows a significant relationship between estimates of γ and the HRV and a positive
relationship for r in HL. However, this result is not as easily interpretable, as r and γ
are jointly needed to determine an individual’s risk attitude. However, the result can be
seen as indicating that the connection between HRV and risk attitudes is influenced by
probability weighting whereas more stressed individuals are more likely to tend towards
inverse S shape-type probability weighting.
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Table 1: Determinants of r-estimates
AH1 AH2 AH3 HL1 HL2 HL3
r 0.24** 0.04 0.16 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.43***
(0.10) (0.55) (0.61) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09)
Female -0.10 0.14 0.16*** 0.13**
(0.20) (0.22) (0.05) (0.06)
Age 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Extraversion 0.00 -0.04*
(0.08) (0.03)
Agreeableness -0.02 -0.04*
(0.12) (0.03)
Conscientiousness -0.06 -0.01
(0.10) (0.03)
Neuroticism -0.08 -0.01
(0.13) (0.02)
Openness -0.14 -0.02
(0.12) (0.03)
HRV ( LFHF ) 0.23* 0.02
(0.13) (0.05)
N 1188 1188 1044 1152 1152 1026
The table illustrates the influence of potential determinants for each elicitation method of
AH and HL. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% significance and * 10 %
significance. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by individuals. The availability of
HRV data has reduced the sample between estimations (due to missing or unreadable data).
The HRV measure for equation AH3 represents the average HRV during the AH stage and
for equation HL6 the average HRV during the HL stage.
While this physiological measure of the HRV is insignificant for the HL
method, the relationship is significant for the AH method (generally both
have the same direction).16 This difference could be due to the fact that the
level of risk taking in HL is relatively stable between the choices, while the risk
taken between AH choices can vary noticeably: In HL for a slightly risk averse
individual the first and last 3 rows of the choice list might be straightforward,
while only the pivotal ones are critical in a physiologically relevant way. For
AH in each period a full range of risky and riskless options can be chosen
16The sign of this relationship was visible throughout basically all alternative specifica-
tions we looked at.
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and most individuals make both risk-seeking and risk-averse choices during
the course of this method. Hence, individuals vary more in their level of
risk-taking and deviations from optimal stress-risk points can be detected in
the data.17 Another possible explanation is that the two methods measure
different types of risk taking which could also be reflected in the difference of
their estimated values and their connection to demographics and personality
traits, and one is simply more strongly related to the physiological state of
the decision maker then the other.
5.2 Analysis with both methods with jointly estimated
values for r
As the methods by HL and AH were designed with a utility function of
Ui(x) = x
1−ri in mind ri can be estimated with data from both methods in a
joint procedure. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of our ri estimates using
a joint procedure and as before separated by gender.18 As was visible before,
estimates for women were more dispersed, but women are neither more or
less risk loving then men from results of the joint procedure.
Figure 2: Distribution of estimated individual risk attitudes (ri) jointly esti-
mated:
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Assuming this joint structure, we investigated whether any variables had a
significant influence on the jointly estimated risk attitude. Table 2 illustrates
17Indeed, there is some evidence that in the AH method in periods where individuals
have a lower LFHF they take more risky choices. However, this effect is not significant.
18We excluded the same individuals for the joint estimation as described on the method-
specific procedures.
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different specifications. Rather surprisingly, we find no variable which has a
significant impact on r. While this could indicate that these variables simply
have no significant connection to the risk attitudes, another reason could be
that the two methods are measuring (slightly) different things, and the joint
estimation washes out some of the effects visible in Table 1. We therefore
allow for this possibility that the two methods measure different r-values in
the next section.
Table 2: Determinants of the joint estimation assuming no structural differ-
ence between the methods
JOI11 JOI12 JOI13 JOI14 JOI15
r 0.28*** 0.00 0.14 0.27*** 0.14
(0.06) (0.40) (0.33) (0.08) (0.31)
Female 0.00 0.15 0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Age 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Extraversion -0.04 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Agreeableness -0.02 -0.05
(0.08) (0.07)
Conscientiousness -0.05 -0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Neuroticism -0.02 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Openness -0.07 -0.06
(0.08) (0.08)
HRV ( LFHF ) 0.15 0.12 0.15
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
N 2160 2160 1944 1944 2016
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% significance and * 10 % significance.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by individuals. The availability of HRV
data has reduced the sample between estimations (due to missing or unreadable data).
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5.3 Drivers of potential differences between HL and
AH measures
As prior analysis indicated that the two methods do not provide with the
same estimate for ri, we investigated differences between the two methods
and potential determinants of such differences. We did so assuming U(x) =
x1−r+∆HL with ∆HL representing the difference between the methods (AH
was used as the baseline and ∆HL hence reflects the additional effect of
HL). We estimated individual-specific estimates of ri as well as a uniform
distribution of r for everyone, the first of which enables us to better identify
potential individual-fixed effects that might drive individual risk attitudes.
Sources of differences, as reflected in ∆HL are only related to general, non-
individual-specific effects. The results from our estimations are included in
Table 3 which shows that the judgment on the significance of differences
between the methods is dependent on whether an individual-specific ri or
uniform r is assumed: Once we move away from assuming individual-specific
risk attitudes and simply searching for general determinants of risk attitudes,
we cannot find a difference between the methods and there are no clear
factors that clearly drive towards differences (only extraversion seems to play
a weakly significant role in having a higher risk attitude in HL compared to
AH).
The picture is different when we take into account individual-specific risk
attitudes. There is a general difference between the methods observable, with
more risk aversion observable in the AH method. This difference becomes in-
significant when controlling for gender and age of the participants (the effect
is marginally significant when only gender is included). Similarly, including
information about personality traits further decreases the significance of the
variables, and none of the personality traits seem to have a significant impact
on the difference. However, there is a statistically significant relationship of
the difference between the two methods and the HRV measure under the
assumption of individual-specific ri-estimates.
19 This means that individuals
who were more stressed during the risk tasks displayed higher risk taking in
the HL method than in the AH method.
19This difference is driven by the higher HRV during the HL task, as further regressions
indicated that used the HRV during HL instead of the HRV during the full period of both
AH and HL.
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Table 3: Determinants of the joint estimation
JOI1 JOI2 JOI3 JOI4 JOI5 JOI6
r -0.89*** -0.86** -0.98*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29***
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Individual effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
∆HL 0.15** -0.84 -0.56 0.02 0.35 0.13
(0.07) (0.52) (0.59) (0.07) (0.39) (0.27)
Female -0.01 0.11 -0.17 -0.16
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13)
Age 0.05** 0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Extraversion 0.15* 0.12*
(0.09) (0.06)
Agreeableness 0.02 0.05
(0.10) (0.07)
Conscientiousness -0.05 0.03
(0.07) (0.06)
Neuroticism 0.09 0.05
(0.10) (0.08)
Openness -0.08 0.01
(0.09) (0.06)
HRV ( LFHF ) 0.18* -0.07
(0.10) (0.07)
δ LFHF -0.04 -0.05
(0.08) (0.07)
N 2052 2052 1872 2052 2052 1944
The table shows the results of our ML estimation for determinants of risk attitudes,
assuming individual-specific attitudes in JOI1−3 and assuming uniform attitudes in
JOI4−6. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% significance and * 10 %
significance. Standard errors are in brackets. Including demographic, personality trait
and physiological variables in JOI4−6 to explain r did not lead to new insights about
these variables, but makes the table less readable. For regressions JOI3 and JOI6 4
participants older then 30 had to be excluded for the estimation model to converge.
Leaving out the (insignificant) age variable and including these 4 participants provides
the same qualitative results. The variable δ LFHF measures
LF
HF (AH)− LFHF (HL).
5.4 Determinants making a timely decision
We used the life saving dilemma to investigate in how far gender, age, risk
attitudes, personality traits and physiological states during the decision pro-
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cess were related to the ability of individuals to save a swimmer. Table 4
shows the results of probit regressions of making a decision to save one of
the swimmers (or exceeding the time limit otherwise).
Table 4: Probit regressions of decision to save swimmer
SLS2 SLS3 SLS4 SLS5
Female -0.05 -0.15 0.23 0.13
(0.30) (0.38) (0.36) (0.44)
Age -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ri(JOI11) 0.18 0.16 0.10
(0.29) (0.27) (0.33)
Extraversion -0.28 -0.61***
(0.19) (0.24)
Agreeableness -0.21 0.13
(0.21) (0.26)
Conscientiousness -0.34* -0.51**
(0.19) (0.24)
Neuroticism -0.38* -0.49**
(0.22) (0.24)
Openness 0.04 0.25
(0.20) (0.25)
HRV ( LFHF ) 0.00 0.06
(0.18) (0.19)
constant -0.27 -0.70 -0.64 -0.90
(0.59) (0.77) (0.65) (0.84)
N 71 61 59 56
The table shows the results of probit regressions on whether a
participant made a decision to save a swimmer or not. *** indi-
cates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% significance and * 10 %
significance.
Gender and age had no significant effect on the ability to make a decision
and a similar conclusion is true for risk attitudes, at least when using the joint
estimate of an individual’s risk attitude ri. This is somewhat surprising, as
we conjectured a more risk averse decision maker to be more hesitant as well
which does not seem to be the case. Some of the personality traits did have
an influence on the decision to save one of the swimmers although their sign
is not always as expected. However, it seems that individuals with moderate
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personality traits are more likely to make a decision. Finally, there was no
clear relationship between the physiological activity of the 20 seconds during
which the decision had to be made and the ability to make a decision. This
is surprising as it indicates that more excitement is not related to the ability
to make this tough decision in time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, our main aim was to understand in how far risk attitudes,
measured using two different elicitation methods were related to demograph-
ics and personality traits. In order to get a better picture about the decision
making process, we also wanted to investigate, in how far these were con-
nected to the physiological state at the time choices were made and the ability
to make a decision in a dilemma in the context of a laboratory experiment.
In the analysis of our data we find that the results from the two risk elic-
itation methods are correlated, but do not provide with the same results:
Correlations as well as ranked correlations are far from one, there also seems
to be a shifter effect between the methods and in AH the distribution of risk
attitudes is also wider as it is in HL. Furthermore, the distribution of risk
attitudes is more dispersed for females then for males and women are signif-
icantly more risk averse in HL but not in AH. However, there is no clearly
statistically significant gender effect driving the difference between the two
methods when analyzing results of a joint estimation.
With respect to personality traits based on the Big Five there is only
some weak evidence that more extraversion and agreeableness are related
to more risk seeking in HL, while there does not seem to be a strong ef-
fect in AH. Furthermore, there is no clear indication that personality traits
drive the difference between the results. This could also be interpreted such
that domain-specific risk taking, which prior literature showed to vary with
personality traits, does not seem to be a major determinant of differences
between the two methods.
Apart from searching for sources of the differences between the elicita-
tion methods, a main aim was to investigate in how far risk attitudes and
physiological states were connected. For this, we used HRV data as an in-
dicator for mental stress during the time of the decision making. We tested
whether such a relationship exists by including HRV in our estimation of
the risk attitude. We find that the HRV and risk taking are related in a
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way that individuals who are less stressed take higher risks in at least one
of the methods. This could mean that risk taking is something not just ad
hoc exciting but more basic and that less stressed individuals are less averse
towards making more risky decisions reflecting their general attitude towards
risk at the time of the decision making rather then their immediate reaction
to the risk task at hand. This effect was significant for AH, but not for HL,
although the direction of the effect is the same.20 Hence, the HRV might
represent more the general physiological state during the experiment, which
influences which decisions are made, rather then the momentary excitement
of the decision.
Finally, we linked risk attitudes, demographics, personality traits and
physiological states to the ability to make a timely decision in a dilemma.
We find that, except for some of the personality traits (extraversion, consci-
entiousness and neuroticism) these were not significant predictors of making
the decision to save one of the swimmers. Hence personality traits can ex-
plain the ability to decide while risk attitudes do not extend to this context
and the physiological state did not promote or inhibit timely decisions.
We conclude with the finding that less stressed individuals in the experi-
ment were also less risk averse while the ability to make a tough decision is
not necessarily linked to the physiological state at the time of the decision,
but rather personality-based. Both findings are interesting for their implica-
tions in real life. For example in companies in which financial risk decisions
are taken by individuals: If more stressed individuals are more risk averse,
this could guide who should be asked to make risky decisions although fur-
ther research might be needed as our study cannot answer if deviations in
experimental risk attitudes between different days are reflected in different
physiological states of a specific decision maker or if our results mainly reflect
differences between individuals. Either result could have central implications,
for example when managing personnel in companies and selecting certain in-
dividuals for specific positions, or for creating (more or less stressful) work
environments.
With respect to the decision in the dilemma our results indicate that
when having to make a tough decision it is more the underlying personality
that leads to the ability to decide, while the stressfulness of this situation
20Potentially the difference is influenced through the different role probability weighting
plays in the two methods, as allowing for probability weighting in HL showed a signifi-
cant effect suggesting that more stressed individuals might display more inverse S -shaped
probability weighting in HL.
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has a minor impact. This could be an interesting consideration, for example
when we are choosing individuals for jobs where decisions under time pressure
have to be made. As such, our results can, despite their explorative nature,
be interesting for individual and institutional decision makers for whom un-
derstanding decision making processes is a major factor for personal and
organizational success.
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A Extensions beyond EUT
A.1 Individual estimates
During our estimation procedure we also considered implied results beyond
an EUT framework, and the concept of probability weighting. We did so
assuming a utility function of Ui(x, p) = wi(p) ·vi(x) where wi(p) represents a
probability weighting function, assigning objective probabilities a subjective
individual weight, and vi(x) the utility (valuation) from receiving outcomes.
We assumed functional forms of wi(p) =
pγi
(pγi+(1−p)γi )−γi and vi(x) = x
1−ri .
Figures 3 (a) and (b) illustrate these distributions of our estimates for
the HL method.21 For this overview and in the following analysis we have
restricted our sample to 45 individuals that had a single switching point
21Unfortunately, for the AH method no reasonable estimates of γi and ri can be found,
as the set of possible choices in each decision is too large a participants chooses one -
optimal - out of a range of more than 30 choice options that all have a unique probability
and outcome attached to them. From decisions in the HL method, however, values for ri
and γi can be estimated although with the size of our sample on each individual we cannot
derive individual estimates that are significantly different from ri = 0 and γi = 1.
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Figure 3: Distributions of ri- and γi-parameters estimated using HL
(a) Distribution of r
0
.
5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
−1 −.5 0 .5
Estimates of individual r
Kernel density estimate
(b) Distribution of γ
0
1
2
3
D
en
si
ty
1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Estimates of individual gammas
Kernel density estimate
(SSP) in both periods of HL to make the graphs readable and to ensure
convergence of our maximum likelihood models.
A.2 Potential determinants of r and γ
We also investigated in how far demographics, personality traits and phys-
iological states were related to r and γ. Table 5 shows the results from
our main specifications. The additional result emerging from this analysis
is observable for the coefficient on the HRV measure as there is no clearly
significant effect of any of the other variables. HRV is potentially positively
related to utility curvature, which would be contrary to the result found for
AH and the tendency in HL assuming EUT. However, there is a negative
relationship between HRV and probability weighting indicating that more
stressed individuals are more likely to display inverse S shape-type probabil-
ity weighting. Taken these two effects together, this could indicate that the
relationship observable before in the EUT-based analysis could be driven by
probability weighting which we were unable to estimate in AH, but which
might nevertheless play a significant role.
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Table 5: Determinants of r and γ
REDU1 REDU2 REDU3 REDU4
r 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.35***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
Age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.05 0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Extraversion -0.06 -0.07**
(0.05) (0.03)
Agreeableness -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Conscientiousness 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.03)
Neuroticism -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Openness 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
HRV ( LFHF ) -0.04 -0.06*
(0.03) (0.03)
γ 1.06 0.94 1.05 1.04
(0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.13)
Age -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.02 -0.10 -0.28**
(0.03) (0.16) (0.13)
Extraversion -0.07 -0.10
(0.18) (0.08)
Agreeableness 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.05)
Conscientiousness 0.04 -0.01
(0.14) (0.04)
Neuroticism -0.03 -0.02
(0.06) (0.03)
Openness -0.04 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
HRV ( LFHF ) -0.11*** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.06)
N 810 774 756 720
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% significance and * 10 % significance.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by individuals. The availability of HRV data
has reduced the sample between estimations (due to missing or unreadable data). The
sample is limited to individuals with single switching points.
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B Instructions and details on the risk elicita-
tion methods
B.1 Introduction
The following part, or game, of this session is an economic experiment. This
means that the amount of your final payment will depend on the decisions
you take in the following stages. I.e., your decisions taken on the next screens,
together with the random outcome of an external probability distribution,
will directly translate into how much you will be paid at the end of the exper-
iment. Please follow the instructions carefully, and please raise your hand if
you have a question: an experiment administrator will come to you. During
the experiment, any talking or other communication between participants is
forbidden.
You will make decisions during this experiment by responding to questions
displayed on the computer screen in front of you. After you have completed
your responses for the decisions on each screen, please press the Continue
button at the bottom of the screen to proceed to the next screen. Your
decisions in this experiment are anonymous, and you are identified solely by
your participant number. The payment you will receive at the end of the
experiment will be kept confidential from all other participants.
This experimental game will be continued over two rounds. You will
receive instructions for each step of the experimental game on your screen.
At the conclusion of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one
decision from Type One and one decision from Type Two to be played to
determine the amount that you will be paid. This means that you (or the
administrator) do not know which decision will be selected. Therefore, it
would be reasonable to treat each decision as if it were the decision that will
be selected for determining your final payoff.
B.2 HL instructions
B.2.1 HL example instructions
Please make sure to read all instructions very carefully. This is an instruction
screen. You do not have to make any decisions on this screen. On the NEXT
screen you will have to make nine decisions between two lotteries. For each of
the nine decisions you MUST select either option A or option B. Each lottery
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is characterised by the probability of receiving one of two payoffs. Below is
an EXAMPLE of only two of the nine decisions that you will be required to
make
Option A 1 Option B 1
p XA 1-p YA p XB 1-p YB
0.3 3 0.7 1 0.5 5 0.5 0
In decision 1 you have to choose between lottery A1 and lottery B1. In
lottery A1 you either receive $1 with probability 0.3 and $3 with probability
0.7. In Lottery B1 you get $0 with probability 0.5 and $5 with probability
0.5.
Remember, at the end of the experiment one decision will be selected at
random. This decision will then be played out and will then contribute to
your final payment. Because the decision that is played is selected randomly
you do not know which decision will be selected and hence it would be rea-
sonable to answer all decisions as if they were the decision that determined
your final payment. When you select an option, an X will indicate your
choice. You can revise your choice as many times as you like. After you have
made all nine choices, click the Continue button to move to the next screen.
B.2.2 HL choice list
Table 6 shows the choice list table presented to experimental subjects.
Table 6: Multiple price list design as in HL
Option A Option B
p XA 1-p YA p XB 1-p YB
0.1 8 0.9 6.4 0.1 15.4 0.9 0.4
0.2 8 0.8 6.4 0.2 15.4 0.8 0.4
0.3 8 0.7 6.4 0.3 15.4 0.7 0.4
0.4 8 0.6 6.4 0.4 15.4 0.6 0.4
0.5 8 0.5 6.4 0.5 15.4 0.5 0.4
0.6 8 0.4 6.4 0.6 15.4 0.4 0.4
0.7 8 0.3 6.4 0.7 15.4 0.3 0.4
0.8 8 0.2 6.4 0.8 15.4 0.2 0.4
0.9 8 0.1 6.4 0.9 15.4 0.1 0.4
The table represents the lottery choice for XA = 8, YA = 6.4, XB = 15.4 and YB = .4
used in the first round. In the second round we used lotteries with XA = 10, YA =
8, XB = 19.25, YB = .5.
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B.3 AH instructions
B.3.1 AH example instructions
In this part of the experiment you will consider many options of gambles.
The gambles will differ according to the amount of money at stake and the
chances of winning that money. An option of gambles might look like this.
Notice, you see all available gambles in the option by moving the slider bar
back and forth, GIVE IT A TRY! The pie chart represents the probability
of winning while the bar chart represents the possible gain. See how there is
a trade off between these two variables as you move the slider.
Maximum gain is $10.00. Each 1 percent increase in the pie decreases pos-
sible earnings by $0.10. Each 1 percent decrease in the pie increases possible
earnings by $0.10
Figure 4: AH picture
Notice that in this example, every time you try to increase the chance
of winning by 1 percentage point, you reduce the amount you would gain
by $0.10. Likewise, each time you increase the amount you can gain by $1,
you reduce the chance of you winning it by 10 percentage points (that is 1
divided by 10). You are simply required to position the slider in the position
that you like the most for each of the nine decision screens. Just as before,
only one of your nine decisions will be selected at random. Because you do
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not know which decision will be selected it would be reasonable to make each
decision as if it were the decision that contributed to you final payment.
B.3.2 AH choice pairs
Table 7 includes the 9 pairs of budgets µ and price in the two rounds of our
experiment.
Table 7: Pairs of maximum gain and cost of probability
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
µ 27.3 56 172 88 49.4 39.2 54.5 207 116
price 0.28 1.17 10.75 2.75 0.77 0.41 0.68 8.62 2.42
The price reflects the cost of getting 1% extra of a winning probability, and µ the amount
that can be won with a corresponding probability of zero, or the budget. To win with
any positive probability, participants have to buy additional winning probability. For
example, in round 1, a participant could chose to win 27.3 − 10 · 0.28 = 24.5 with a
probability of 10%, 27.3− 20 · 0.28 = 21.7 with a probability of 20%, and so on.
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C Examples of experimental screens
Figure 5: Screenshot from the film
Figure 6: Pictures shown for option to save one of the two swimmers
(a) Save left swimmer (b) Save right swimmer
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